Inconsequential* Action -- A Trademark of Today's Opposition

**In this post I take a brief break from my series on the building collapse in Bangladesh and its implications for international labor practices. Additionally, this post has been in the works for a while, and may not be completely up-to-date. While the most recent events are not accounted for, my observations and comments do not seem to have been proved incorrect.**

Today's democracy activists represent a diversity of religions, socioeconomic statuses, levels of education, and, most importantly, objectives. The visible achievements of collective action inspire some hope that groups within various movements can work together to a common end. Unfortunately, when there is disunity among opposition groups with respect to long-term ambitions (systemic change), the successful accomplishment of the initial goal (the overthrow of a particular leader, for instance) can easily become the beginning of equally taxing problems down the line. This is true for several reasons, which I'll explain using examples from the Egypt, Turkey, and Syria.

To begin, the vague notion of "reform", is not an operational goal. Without specifics, progress cannot be measured. As a result, the effectiveness of the movement becomes less persuasive and will eventual lose clout with the public and its number of committed supporters will wane. Activists need to feel that their time is not wasted. That their efforts are moving their goals forward. An activist lends his or herself to a movement as an individual who shares a collective ambition to solve the problem. An activist is not an activist by virtue of having expressed a grievance. They must stand in support of a preferred vision for the future.

 For one example, protesters in Egypt were united in their objective of ousting the Mubarak regime. But once achieved, the lack of a collective long-term ambition made possible what was essentially a military coup. Mohammed ElBaradei, a prominent opposition leader, describes the outcome as "a loss of control over the revolution" and attributes it to "the divisions that took place among the youth."¹ But is it practical to expect unity from a coalition consisting of nine separate youth groups--not to mention the many non-youth groups? Abdul Rahman Monsour, the administrator an opposition facebook group"We are all Khaled Said", dismisses the possibility. In an interview with al Jazeera Monsour explained that because of the diversity of social and political ideology that comprise the movement, the idea of a unified group is "silly".

Yet if this is the case it may, unfortunately, be time for the youth to throw in the towel. Admittedly, the possibility of a perfectly unified movement is virtually null. But political movements have been successful in a vast number of cases, indicating that there is room for some level of discontinuity within political movements. Only a general consensus on a vision for the future is necessary--a vision to which no group explicitly rejects. A general idea of democracy, for instance--and hopefully one not defined by elections alone. A movement cannot settle for attracting only those already prone to a particular ideological bent. Their job, by and large, is to persuade a population that their vision is preferable to others proposed. Unfortunately, this is difficult for a peaceful movement; violence is a compelling force and one often wielded by incumbent political powers. But in the event that a population is persuaded by arguments made peacefully, it is likely the outcome will be more stable in the long term than those led either than a divided opposition or by a unified violent force. The youth should embrace this fact, and resist the sense that unity is futile. No opposition movement will be entirely cohesive in its vision for the future, but without a general agreement the the situation will become a power vacuum and make the movement vulnerable to cooptation by whatever group is most powerful and cohesive. This is how the military usurped power in the aftermath of Mubarak's ousting in 2011. It also explains how the youth--even those supporting the Muslim brotherhood--were so quickly excluded once the Brotherhood was elected. Ahmed Maher, the leader of the youth protest movement "April 6th" explains "We supported Morsi during the presidential campaign and were a reason behind his victory. The Muslim Brotherhood loved us at that time. But when disagreement started over the constitution, a campaign of distortion started against us".

Syria is caught in the middle of a similar situation. The movemnt's/-s' are united in their goal of regime change, but their short-term conceptions of how the overthrow should occur are varied, and long-term visions range from genuine democratic reforms to the implementation of Sharia law. The problem is not that the groups themselves have no vision, it is that there are competing visions preventing unification, making it hard for opposition forces to gain a foothold against the regime, and making it difficult for the international community to support a collective opposition.² Ultimately this places foreign states that are in a position to help to pit themselves against each other. This makes it more difficult for the international community to make an impact and makes the issue of support a prohibitively political one.

 Turkey's opposition is the most cohesive--at least in the short-term--of the movements discussed herein. Yet while we have only witnessed the early stages of what may become a much longer standoff between the government and its increasingly vocal opposition in Turkey, only discontent is certain. The repeal of specific legislation that threaten the remaining urban green spaces is the most imminent political demand. But protesters' general condemnation of the current regime may indicate larger ambitions related to more sweeping and systemic reforms. At present, their specific list of demands lack any systemic reforms and concentrate only on culpability and the retreat from undemocratic practices exercised by the police in response to demonstrations. For instance, the rejection of the ban on alcohol has gained only moderate attention, and the broader condemnation of the increasingly Islamist tendencies of the regime have not found a place in the specific list of demands. But perhaps this is prudent. Perhaps some sense of consensus is in the works, and if that is the case, it is a wise strategy. Making conflicting demands signals an easily divided mass--a weaker and more vulnerable one. It is the last signal a movement means to impart.

But sooner, rather than later, a movement should, at the very least, impart a long-term active vision. That is, the movement should make clear what it does want--not just what it doesn't. One of the Free Syrian Army's biggest mistakes has been to rally supporters singularly around the desire to see Assad ousted, without any articulate ambitions for a post-Assad state. As a result, "revolutionaries"--whomever they may represent--form a temporary alliance, recognizing that their immediate objectives require some degree of unification, even if their overall ambitions are at stark odds.

Thus, the lesson here is that democratic movements require a generally unified short- and long-term visions. Recent movements have so far failed to achieve these components. The formation of a successful movement--one that can withstand outsider attempts at co-optation--will prove a laborious and pain-staking process. Unfortunately, this question is nil in some instances. A plea to future pro-democracy movements is this: first, recognize that lasting reforms are unlikely so long as those in power are challenged by a divided, and therefore weaker, opposition. Second, have confidence that the sacrifices made for the sake of solidarity will likely prove their worth.

 *This title is perhaps reductionist. Certainly, as you make your way through the post you'll notice that my argument is not so much that there are no consequences to opposition movements, but rather that those consequences are, by and large, not those intended by any--or at least the majority--of the groups initially involved.

¹ I presume that ElBareidi's singling out of the youth is a product of the massive turnout of youth demonstrators. Nevertheless, it seems unfair to single out a particular demographic as the overarching source of a movement's undoing. Divisions existed within the youth, between "the youth" as opposed to other
Admittedly, the "how" is more of a past question as the mode of regime change effort has definitively crossed the point of no-return to violent civil war, from what was once a peaceful movement for change. "How" is still a relevant question when considering macro-level analysis of the effectiveness of grassroots movements.

²It is now apparent that Qatar is funneling the arms supplied to rebels in the Libyan revolution into Syria. One might interpret this as a good thing, noting that the West's pleas for Middle-Eastern states to shoulder some of the burden in this conflict are finally being heard. But this relief is short-lived, as it is also apparent that some of the groups that Qatar chooses to arm are not those most likely to promote democratic transition in Syria (or anywhere, really). I should note, however, that reports indicate that currently, Qatar is supplying the FSA rather than to blacklisted extremist groups. Nevertheless, the latter groups are having little trouble obtaining weapons from the various FSA allies.