Ignoring (not forgetting) History

Krugman (10-11-2012)

The tendency to abandon lessons of history is a prominent trademark of contemporary policy-making. In a talk at the Commonwealth Club of California last spring, Paul Krugman remarked that "not only were they [the banks, specifically JP Morgan] taking risks just like the banks did before the big crisis, they were taking the same risks...it's as if they were determined to have a repeat -- to remake that movie when the first one is still in the theaters." But the metaphor extends beyond economic policy, constituting a fundamental characteristic of US foreign policy as well. This country, and indeed, the international community, has faced problems similar to those of the present day before now. The Great Depression, for instance, was a product of banks getting to big, resulting in the marginalization and economic devastation of the most vulnerable citizens. It had the consequence of increasing disparities of wealth and driving the kind of political polarization we see today.

But, unlike policy-makers of the depression-era, today's politicians are resolved to maintain the status quo. For instance, the Glass-Steagall Act was put in place to combat the risky behavior of the financial sector that contributed in no small part to the depression. But, in the 1990s--the time of plenty--President Clinton made the ill-concieved decision to approve the bill's dismemberment. Admittedly, it is unlikely that Glass-Steagall would have prevented the current crisis if still in effect. But the point (that we already know that an unregulated banking system can have catastrophic effects is a lesson we've already learned) still stands. And this is not an accident. Krugman further points out that individuals have been "paid to forget" these lessons--by those who can not only afford to bankroll campaigns and aggressively lobby legislators, but who also profit from any resulting economic collapse. But it's not a secret: most Americans can't.

The same people further deny that government spending--namely the New Deal--contributed to the end of the Great Depression, arguing instead that the industry that World War Two promoted was the key to recovery. What they fail to recognize--but undoubtedly know--is that it was government spending that made the growth of industry possible. Indeed, throughout the economic recovery of the government both borrowed and spent record amounts. Projects initiated under the New Deal permitted growth to continue after the war. It produced roads making transportation of goods possible and it put money in people's pockets that would be spent, thereby stimulating the economy, rather than saved, as was the money belonging to the wealthiest. What does this show? War does not stimulate growth (a fact all too obvious from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan), but government spending does.

But shockingly (or perhaps not so), it's not only historical evidence of the economic costs of austerity that are aggressively denied. It's the evidence of the present too. Think Greece. Austerity there has produced a volatile situation in which unemployment means people aren't earning, and therefore aren't spending money. Under these situations, growth is impossible. And so is paying down the national debt.
Still, lenders imposed harsh austerity measures including widespread spending cuts on Greece (and other troubled economies) which only magnified the liquidity trap. The truth is, there is only so much a budget can be cut. It can't be cut more than it spends, and it's impossible to reduce the budget to zero and maintain a viable state. Stimulating the economy, on the other hand, means increased revenue. Since we know that trickle-down economics doesn't work, we also know that taxes won't minimize growth of the economy. Why would companies invest in building factories or hiring, if demand for products is down and there's little hope of increasing it? Stimulus must be more widespread than trusting individual companies to create jobs. A widespread injection of money is crucial. Fearmongerers would have us believe that such an injection would cause massive inflation. They've been predicting it for years. It hasn't happened.

Apart from domestic policy, the US also maintains a foreign policy ambivalent to the lessons of history. In A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power documents multiple cases of genocide that have occurred since the holocaust but have received inadequate, late, or no intervention from the United States. Syria poses an interesting problem—but it’s not unique. Indeed, we saw it in Libya. Currently—and for the foreseeable future—aggression targeting political groups or parties does not constitute genocide. But although this disqualifies the invocation of the genocide convention, it does not change the fact that crimes against humanity are occurring in Syria. And that under the 2005 World Summit Responsibility to Protect (R2P), such crimes still warrant international intervention.

In a previous post I commented on the dangerous trajectory the conflict in Syria—and, consequently, the direction that the US relationship with Syria is taking. I discussed the effects of inaction, and how guilt can lead the US to take an overly tolerant approach to the oppositional victor—namely in Rwanda. So what am I advocating? Insofar as a political or tactical solution is concerned, I, like most, am at a loss. But there are questions to which we have answers. We have an approximate estimate of refugees and IDPs in Syria. We have relatively accurate figures regarding the cost of maintaining the bare minimum standards of care for this ever-growing population. But currently, the UNHCR is operating on 25 percent of its estimated need. 

And this is where I return to the issue of history-denial. We already know what happens when agencies like UNHCR are under-resourced. The result is an angry civilian population, which makes for easy pray for combatant recruitment. Indeed, few things breed animosity and contempt like neglect. The 1990s crisis along the Congo-Rwanda border offers clear evidence. There are also complex emotional components of neglect of civilians--hopelessness, bitterness, and vengeful desires, for instance.Whereas desperation can be addressed thoroughly and quickly with sufficient political will, these emotional components are more difficult to eliminate. Many of these stem from the political roots of the conflict and even once a political solution is put into effect, years if not generations may pass before feelings of resentment and betrayal are mitigated. 

The vulnerability and desperation faced by refugees have severe and game-changing consequences that not only effect the trajectory of the conflict, but will potentially also pose mounting risks of insecurities for the international community. This is a particularly disconcerting consequence of globalization, and one to which virtually no country is immune.   Interestingly, US has contributed quite generously to humanitarian efforts, comparable to the unmet obligations of other nations. Still, the UNHCR is left to operate on approximately 21 percent of the estimated budget needs. But, as has been the case on numerous occasions, the US (and the international community) offers too little too late. Refugee camps hold over a million refugees and internally displaced people remain scattered throughout the country, facing much risk and experiencing growing anger and frustration.  When the Assad regime falls (yes, I'm assuming that this will be the eventual outcome), the US will likely find that resources that build trust with and among the people would have proved a wise investment--perhaps more than resources spent ousting the current regime. It might have made civilians less willing to concede their newly-acquired rights to extremists in exchange for a chance at not being hungry. It might have lessened resentment for the US and decreased the potential of an animus post-Assad US-Syrian relationship. Civilians are presented with choices now. Addressing the needs of civilians caught in conflict is not a challenge that can be left to the future.

Although the most convincing argument for adequate humanitarian support at the policy-making level is one based on national security, the best argument is a moral one. The fact is, the morally right answer to this problem is the one that will yield the best results overall. Although we haven't fully observed any instances of a wholly sufficient response to humanitarian crisis, we are very familiar with the horrific consequences of those that fall short. 

Let me conclude with this final point because I want to be quite clear. I am not suggesting that a humanitarian response is in anyway a longterm solution to the problem in Syria. A humanitarian mission is not successful until it can leave, and that requires a political solution. My argument is this: given that we don't have (nor should we have) any explicit control over the political outcomes of this conflict, we should recognize that we have some agency in how civilians experience the war--and the international community's response to it. I commend the President for his bid for cooperation from the countries yet to meet their obligations of support, but should the bid continue to be unsuccessful the US will have to consider further contributions to humanitarian, rather than such focused military efforts. The humanitarian battle can be won, and is one that we, as human beings, have the right and responsibility to fight. 

Ultimately, ending the political battles at home and abroad require not only that the events past be remembered, but that we ensure that the lessons of that history endure and culminate in wise and prudent policy-making.