Ignoring (not forgetting) History

Krugman (10-11-2012)

The tendency to abandon lessons of history is a prominent trademark of contemporary policy-making. In a talk at the Commonwealth Club of California last spring, Paul Krugman remarked that "not only were they [the banks, specifically JP Morgan] taking risks just like the banks did before the big crisis, they were taking the same risks...it's as if they were determined to have a repeat -- to remake that movie when the first one is still in the theaters." But the metaphor extends beyond economic policy, constituting a fundamental characteristic of US foreign policy as well. This country, and indeed, the international community, has faced problems similar to those of the present day before now. The Great Depression, for instance, was a product of banks getting to big, resulting in the marginalization and economic devastation of the most vulnerable citizens. It had the consequence of increasing disparities of wealth and driving the kind of political polarization we see today.

But, unlike policy-makers of the depression-era, today's politicians are resolved to maintain the status quo. For instance, the Glass-Steagall Act was put in place to combat the risky behavior of the financial sector that contributed in no small part to the depression. But, in the 1990s--the time of plenty--President Clinton made the ill-concieved decision to approve the bill's dismemberment. Admittedly, it is unlikely that Glass-Steagall would have prevented the current crisis if still in effect. But the point (that we already know that an unregulated banking system can have catastrophic effects is a lesson we've already learned) still stands. And this is not an accident. Krugman further points out that individuals have been "paid to forget" these lessons--by those who can not only afford to bankroll campaigns and aggressively lobby legislators, but who also profit from any resulting economic collapse. But it's not a secret: most Americans can't.

The same people further deny that government spending--namely the New Deal--contributed to the end of the Great Depression, arguing instead that the industry that World War Two promoted was the key to recovery. What they fail to recognize--but undoubtedly know--is that it was government spending that made the growth of industry possible. Indeed, throughout the economic recovery of the government both borrowed and spent record amounts. Projects initiated under the New Deal permitted growth to continue after the war. It produced roads making transportation of goods possible and it put money in people's pockets that would be spent, thereby stimulating the economy, rather than saved, as was the money belonging to the wealthiest. What does this show? War does not stimulate growth (a fact all too obvious from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan), but government spending does.

But shockingly (or perhaps not so), it's not only historical evidence of the economic costs of austerity that are aggressively denied. It's the evidence of the present too. Think Greece. Austerity there has produced a volatile situation in which unemployment means people aren't earning, and therefore aren't spending money. Under these situations, growth is impossible. And so is paying down the national debt.
Still, lenders imposed harsh austerity measures including widespread spending cuts on Greece (and other troubled economies) which only magnified the liquidity trap. The truth is, there is only so much a budget can be cut. It can't be cut more than it spends, and it's impossible to reduce the budget to zero and maintain a viable state. Stimulating the economy, on the other hand, means increased revenue. Since we know that trickle-down economics doesn't work, we also know that taxes won't minimize growth of the economy. Why would companies invest in building factories or hiring, if demand for products is down and there's little hope of increasing it? Stimulus must be more widespread than trusting individual companies to create jobs. A widespread injection of money is crucial. Fearmongerers would have us believe that such an injection would cause massive inflation. They've been predicting it for years. It hasn't happened.

Apart from domestic policy, the US also maintains a foreign policy ambivalent to the lessons of history. In A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power documents multiple cases of genocide that have occurred since the holocaust but have received inadequate, late, or no intervention from the United States. Syria poses an interesting problem—but it’s not unique. Indeed, we saw it in Libya. Currently—and for the foreseeable future—aggression targeting political groups or parties does not constitute genocide. But although this disqualifies the invocation of the genocide convention, it does not change the fact that crimes against humanity are occurring in Syria. And that under the 2005 World Summit Responsibility to Protect (R2P), such crimes still warrant international intervention.

In a previous post I commented on the dangerous trajectory the conflict in Syria—and, consequently, the direction that the US relationship with Syria is taking. I discussed the effects of inaction, and how guilt can lead the US to take an overly tolerant approach to the oppositional victor—namely in Rwanda. So what am I advocating? Insofar as a political or tactical solution is concerned, I, like most, am at a loss. But there are questions to which we have answers. We have an approximate estimate of refugees and IDPs in Syria. We have relatively accurate figures regarding the cost of maintaining the bare minimum standards of care for this ever-growing population. But currently, the UNHCR is operating on 25 percent of its estimated need. 

And this is where I return to the issue of history-denial. We already know what happens when agencies like UNHCR are under-resourced. The result is an angry civilian population, which makes for easy pray for combatant recruitment. Indeed, few things breed animosity and contempt like neglect. The 1990s crisis along the Congo-Rwanda border offers clear evidence. There are also complex emotional components of neglect of civilians--hopelessness, bitterness, and vengeful desires, for instance.Whereas desperation can be addressed thoroughly and quickly with sufficient political will, these emotional components are more difficult to eliminate. Many of these stem from the political roots of the conflict and even once a political solution is put into effect, years if not generations may pass before feelings of resentment and betrayal are mitigated. 

The vulnerability and desperation faced by refugees have severe and game-changing consequences that not only effect the trajectory of the conflict, but will potentially also pose mounting risks of insecurities for the international community. This is a particularly disconcerting consequence of globalization, and one to which virtually no country is immune.   Interestingly, US has contributed quite generously to humanitarian efforts, comparable to the unmet obligations of other nations. Still, the UNHCR is left to operate on approximately 21 percent of the estimated budget needs. But, as has been the case on numerous occasions, the US (and the international community) offers too little too late. Refugee camps hold over a million refugees and internally displaced people remain scattered throughout the country, facing much risk and experiencing growing anger and frustration.  When the Assad regime falls (yes, I'm assuming that this will be the eventual outcome), the US will likely find that resources that build trust with and among the people would have proved a wise investment--perhaps more than resources spent ousting the current regime. It might have made civilians less willing to concede their newly-acquired rights to extremists in exchange for a chance at not being hungry. It might have lessened resentment for the US and decreased the potential of an animus post-Assad US-Syrian relationship. Civilians are presented with choices now. Addressing the needs of civilians caught in conflict is not a challenge that can be left to the future.

Although the most convincing argument for adequate humanitarian support at the policy-making level is one based on national security, the best argument is a moral one. The fact is, the morally right answer to this problem is the one that will yield the best results overall. Although we haven't fully observed any instances of a wholly sufficient response to humanitarian crisis, we are very familiar with the horrific consequences of those that fall short. 

Let me conclude with this final point because I want to be quite clear. I am not suggesting that a humanitarian response is in anyway a longterm solution to the problem in Syria. A humanitarian mission is not successful until it can leave, and that requires a political solution. My argument is this: given that we don't have (nor should we have) any explicit control over the political outcomes of this conflict, we should recognize that we have some agency in how civilians experience the war--and the international community's response to it. I commend the President for his bid for cooperation from the countries yet to meet their obligations of support, but should the bid continue to be unsuccessful the US will have to consider further contributions to humanitarian, rather than such focused military efforts. The humanitarian battle can be won, and is one that we, as human beings, have the right and responsibility to fight. 

Ultimately, ending the political battles at home and abroad require not only that the events past be remembered, but that we ensure that the lessons of that history endure and culminate in wise and prudent policy-making.

Of Hawks and Vultures

In theory, the 2013 sequestration "decision" was designed to be so devastating that it would force upon congress a deficit reduction agreement. So why didn't it work? If you can follow the logic of the theory, the answer is clear: the requirements of the plan were not equally debilitating to both parties. Nearly all of the Democrat-advocated spending would be crippled, while the only republican-endorsed spending was military. Although the defense budget would face a larger percentage of cuts, according to NPR's Pentagon correspondent, Tom Bowman, the US military would remain the strongest military in the world--even if its budget was cut by $500 billion over the next 10 years. So essentially, the sequestration was the ultimate boon to the Republican agenda. Indeed, allowing the sequestration measures to take effect imposes no costs on Republicans and therefore provides no impetus for them to work with Democrats to create a balanced plan. However, their hard and uncompromising stance on an issue with such devastating consequences for so many Americans may not come without political costs.

But Republicans deny the duplicity of their (in)actions against ninety-eight percent of US citizens, claiming that they met their obligations to increase revenue back in January. They assert that the revenue discussion is over and that the bulk of deficit reduction must consist of spending cuts. In fact their obligations are not met--even according to their own standards, namely closing tax loopholes. But even if those loopholes were closed, this hardly makes up for the trillion dollars in tax revenue that the proposed tax increases would generate. Conservatives argue that any increases on taxes forces disproportionate financial burden onto the wealthy--or as they refer to them, the "job creators". This financial notion of burden is a farce. When we discuss dignity or unity or respect, we are not talking about a dollar balance in the bank. We're talking about the quality of life people can enjoy or not enjoy. And by these standards, the poor already shoulder a tremendous amount of the burden for deficit reduction, and republican propositions will only add to it. Meanwhile, their claims that reducing taxes on the wealthy will boost the economy by creating jobs has been empirically shown to be false. The real results of these cuts are a manufactured liquidity trap that not only allows the wealthy to keep wealth they don't need, but profit off the poverty of those in the labor market, who are forced to work at whatever wage with no leverage to improve it.

So what can be learned about the Republican agenda from their stance on the sequester? If they believe that military spending is essential to protecting national security--and with a budget as bloated as it is, this is nothing if not illogical--they are willing to sacrifice that security to protect the economic interests of the wealthiest among us--those needing protection the least. Republicans pride themselves on their "hawkish" approach to national security, but their hawkishness is really devoted to protection of their own wealth and the wealth of those willing to bankroll their campaigns. In effect, in their ambivalence towards sequestration , Republicans expose themselves not as national security "hawks" but as economic vultures.

Regrettable Inaction? Uniting For Peace?

While the situation on the ground in Syria is different in many respects, the lack of international action is all too familiar. The world has witnessed it in Rwanda, Cambodia, Bosnia--the list is rather long. Believe it or not, this inaction will have consequences for major powers on the world stage. I'm thinking specifically of the political aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda. Guilt-ridden and embarrassed, world powers fell easy prey to manipulation by the newly-established Rwandan government. It attempted to (and arguably, succeeded at) securing loans and political support, even while terrorizing not only its own citizens, but those of neighboring countries as well. The evidence of this is becoming increasingly clear, and while I won't go as far as to say that a reverse genocide occurred under current President Kagame, it is beyond question that he was behind much of the horrific violence that followed the genocide throughout the Great Lakes region. I am not, however, suggesting that this will be the case in Syria. At present, there is no basis for such speculation. I am only trying to convey the impact of inaction on future relations. Nevertheless, it is probable that the conflict in Syria will long out-last the Bashar presidency in that country. I say this for several reasons. For one, Bashar has civilian supporters, and not all of them are perpetrators of violence. These people have rights to security as well. Should the opposition succeed--and it is a committed and passionate group--it is unlikely that they will not face opposition of their own. This, in and of itself, is not a bad thing--indeed, democracy is defined by conflict--although theoretically acted out in a judicious and non-violent manner. Should the conflict following Bashar's fall (when/if it happens) remain violent, and should the subsequent government seek reprisal, as was undeniably the case in Rwanda, the international community will have a new crisis of conscience to face.

The fallout fallowing the Rwandan genocide was demonstrated the effects of inaction on state legitimacy. While it is too soon to tell how the crisis in Syria will end--and I do hope it is with the fall of Bashar, the possibility of reciprocated violence is real and the negligent international community may once again, find itself backed into a corner.

The question of what the international community should do remains, and I have no real proposition to offer. Albeit optimistic, the closest I can come is to recommend a Chapter VII international peacekeeping force. But even if deployed, the violence is such that even the mission of protecting civilians from violence perpetrated from either side--with no political ambitions at all--is unlikely hasten individual peacekeepers to engage. This is understandable. The weapons of the government far surpass any that a peacekeeping force would be permitted, and there is little such a force could do in the face of an air raid. Nevertheless, the international community is not without options. Regional organizations also have rights to intervention under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, though it seems unlikely that they will be taken to task to the same degree as inactive Western bloc, NATO. Indeed, though the League's stakes are (arguably) higher, motivating such risky action poses a difficult political question for its member countries. Similarly, unilateral action by any country is bound to attract criticism. Another proposition--one supported by the opposition--is the international community's arming of the rebel forces. The precautionary principle, however, would tend against such a move. A post-conflict society needs less, not more guns. If long-term stability is an objective, a free flow of arms into the volatile area will prove detrimental to it. Prior experience in the Middle East has demonstrated this time and time again.

It would seem that any solution would require, at least, some form of military intervention beyond a peacekeeping mission--even if its ambition is in line with those of peacekeeping (protection not combat). The Syrian military is simply too well armed to accomodate a lesser approach. But, the willful neglect of China and Russia to favor any form of action hinders this possibility.

Unless...

Although widely unknown, there is a mechanism--and there has been, since the Cold War--which permits some dancing around the Security Council/P5 issue. It's a concept known as "Uniting For Peace". It was designed precisely for this purpose. As described in a document (found here) in the UN Audiovisual library,

" The adoption of this resolution came as a response to the strategy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from North Korea."

Sound familiar? It should. We are facing a problem of the same order with respect to Syria as we have in numerous cases since the resolution's passage in 1950--even when 'armed' with this (largely unknown) legal mechanism specifically designed to circumvent it. Christian Tomuschat, Professor emeritus at Humbolt University, Berlin, explains:

"Resolution 377 A (V) has a potential that could subvert the well-equilibrated balance of power within the United Nations, a potential that is not disclosed in a recent description of the role and authority of the General Assembly (see resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006, annex, para. 1). But it would actually be used against the Security Council only in case of general dissatisfaction with the policies of the permanent members. Notwithstanding their sheer numerical superiority, the many Members of the United Nations are much too weak to attempt to challenge the decisions made at the Security Council".

In this case, however, the international community is not split in its sense that the Assad regime must be stopped. Only two countries vetoed the resolution. Thus, in this case, the strength truly lies with the GA. Even with all of its economic strength, China cannot take on the world. Its economy, in fact, depends on it. So why are we so scared? A tool exists, a near consensus exists, it is will that is lacking, and the consequences will long be felt, once the dust has settled on Syria.

Qualifying, But Not Qualified

This day after Super-Tuesday, the internet and news sources are a-buzz with speculation as to who the next Republican candidate for president might be. These assessments often associate the amassing of delegate votes with qualification for the job in question. But aside from delegate votes, what else can we learn from the primary process? Well, for one, we can learn something about the voters themselves. We can also, without reference to public opinion, learn very practical things about the candidates--things that, surprisingly, scarcely enter the discourse. One of these things: actual fitness of the candidates for their positions. Are they organized? Are they responsible? Can they prioritize? Can they choose proper staff? With whom do they choose to surround themselves?

In the last 24 hours, some interesting facts have emerged. These observations primarily concern Rick Santorum. So far, we have learned--apart from his ludicrous right-wing situation on the political spectrum--is not organized, or responsible, cannot prioritize, or staff appropriately. And, in spite of these shortcomings, will not surround himself with people who can compensate for them. Evidence? His neglect even to get himself on several of the Ohio ballots. This, one would think, would be quite at the top of any candidate's to-do list. His failure to do so is disturbing enough, but far from the most disturbing.

What I find to be the most discomfiting thing about this, is his amazing success in the primaries. What are people looking for in a president? Certainly, an effective president would not be so neglectful of essential tasks. Yet this obvious shortcomings seemed to have little effect on people's decision to vote for him--even if it had a tremendous effect on who could vote for him: citizens in 18 delegates' worth of districts. What's more, it demonstrates his inability--or unwillingness--to learn from his mistakes. One would hope that after failing to get on the Virginia ballot, he would make a habit of double checking. Apparently not. Interesting. What does this say about the voters? They're more interested in who does the job than the success with which he might do it. How did contributors to his campaign--who may have lost their candidate on the basis of his own negligence--feel about it? Did they change their minds about his readiness? Again: apparently not. How Santorum conducted his campaign seems to have had little effect on how voters perceive his ability to do the job. That is disheartening to me, as a citizen.

His defenders might stipulate that, as president, he will have plenty of people at his command to look out for such things--such not-so-minute details of his tenure. But is the fact that his hand-picked campaign staff were so inept at their job that they forgot to get their candidate--someone whose job it is to secure votes on the ballot at all? Still other defenders might celebrate his ability to gain so many votes despite his ineligibility make it onto the ballot in numerous congressional districts (even, in fact, in the district in which he gave his "victory speech" last night). These are the people that Rick Santorum has decided are the best suited to serve him. If president, will he chose similarly ill-adept individuals to serve us? Apparently, a large part of the country believes this possibility to be irrelevant to his capacity to serve the country as president--commander in chief. I am not one of these people. And frankly, this leaves me quite distressed not only over the state of our potential leadership, but over the state of our citizenry--their common sense, their commitment to good government, their practicality in general.

The lessons drawn from this, I argue, show more about his voters than about him. They too, are irresponsible. And yet each one of them has an ability to influence the selection of one of the next candidates for president.