A new — but not unrelated direction

Dear readers,

It’s been years since my last update. This is due, in part, to time spent moving to the UK, finishing my PhD dissertation, getting married. Laziness was not uninvolved.

But, I’m back. The name of this blog suggests an exclusive concentration on US foreign relations and coverage thereof. Having moved abroad, I’m embracing my Americaness in a new context: the perspective of an American living in a new society with a new government type, and increased access to foreign media and a wealth of new world views. For this reason I’m not changing the name.

Syria: Living and Dying in Iraq's Shaddow

***The author is "cleaning house" and publishing posts from 2013; these have not been updated to reflect changes. Views on newer develops will follow.***

For the clear-minded among us, the second Iraq war harkens sentiments sympathetic to those of John to Abigail Adams in a 1974 letter:

"Great is the guilt of an unnecessary war"; and

"Guilt as the war commenced. Guilt as the war continues in new and ever-changing forms."

The current era is plagued with guilt. It is the era that witnessed and routinely despairs at the atrocities that happened (and many continue) in Cambodia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bosnia, Sudan, and Kosovo. It is an era of missing countless opportunities to halt human suffering and head-hanging at the memory. It is the same era that failed so many times to protect the most vulnerable and made mistakes that cost too many lives. It is the one whose resolve came too late to stop atrocities, too late to champion oppression, and too late even to demonstrate compassion for the oppressed.

In Syria the world is embarking on another path to inevitable embarrassment. But there is a reason for countries' reluctance to intervene. It is rooted in the lead up to the Iraq war, which featured the same (though false) accusations, in the same region, in a similar time, with quite similar (and many of the same) players. Both promise democracy and humanitarian relief.

Engagement in such a conflict is an inherently difficult sell. But there are distinct and crucial differences between the war in Iraq and the resignation of the international community to the situation in Syria. The second war in Iraq pulled the wool over the international community's eyes. It's time to shed the blind fold.

But before I go further I want to pre-empt any suggestion that I am making a call for another war in the Middle East by stating now that my intention here is not to advocate for further militarization, but to beg the international community not to base its decisions regarding Syria on its experience in Iraq.

When we hear about chemical weapons, of WMDs, we are not talking about suspicions of possession. We are not talking about states (or corporations) poising themselves to drain the oil wealth of one country into the coffers of another. There is no powerpoint illustrating a trumped-up theory to the UN security council. Rather, we have indisputable knowledge of an increasingly aggressive and despicable regime that is (using our own premises for aggression (terrorism) to justify) murdering its people. This time we have footage of bombings, leveled cities, corpses, and the contorted and convulsing bodies of civilians infused with toxic nerve agents. These accounts are not suspicions. They are humanity's greatest fears realized.

A decade after the invasion of Iraq, we are surely not a decade wiser; but let's at least show an increased capacity to discern truth from fiction. Only a spade is a spade.

Inconsequential* Action -- A Trademark of Today's Opposition

**In this post I take a brief break from my series on the building collapse in Bangladesh and its implications for international labor practices. Additionally, this post has been in the works for a while, and may not be completely up-to-date. While the most recent events are not accounted for, my observations and comments do not seem to have been proved incorrect.**

Today's democracy activists represent a diversity of religions, socioeconomic statuses, levels of education, and, most importantly, objectives. The visible achievements of collective action inspire some hope that groups within various movements can work together to a common end. Unfortunately, when there is disunity among opposition groups with respect to long-term ambitions (systemic change), the successful accomplishment of the initial goal (the overthrow of a particular leader, for instance) can easily become the beginning of equally taxing problems down the line. This is true for several reasons, which I'll explain using examples from the Egypt, Turkey, and Syria.

To begin, the vague notion of "reform", is not an operational goal. Without specifics, progress cannot be measured. As a result, the effectiveness of the movement becomes less persuasive and will eventual lose clout with the public and its number of committed supporters will wane. Activists need to feel that their time is not wasted. That their efforts are moving their goals forward. An activist lends his or herself to a movement as an individual who shares a collective ambition to solve the problem. An activist is not an activist by virtue of having expressed a grievance. They must stand in support of a preferred vision for the future.

 For one example, protesters in Egypt were united in their objective of ousting the Mubarak regime. But once achieved, the lack of a collective long-term ambition made possible what was essentially a military coup. Mohammed ElBaradei, a prominent opposition leader, describes the outcome as "a loss of control over the revolution" and attributes it to "the divisions that took place among the youth."¹ But is it practical to expect unity from a coalition consisting of nine separate youth groups--not to mention the many non-youth groups? Abdul Rahman Monsour, the administrator an opposition facebook group"We are all Khaled Said", dismisses the possibility. In an interview with al Jazeera Monsour explained that because of the diversity of social and political ideology that comprise the movement, the idea of a unified group is "silly".

Yet if this is the case it may, unfortunately, be time for the youth to throw in the towel. Admittedly, the possibility of a perfectly unified movement is virtually null. But political movements have been successful in a vast number of cases, indicating that there is room for some level of discontinuity within political movements. Only a general consensus on a vision for the future is necessary--a vision to which no group explicitly rejects. A general idea of democracy, for instance--and hopefully one not defined by elections alone. A movement cannot settle for attracting only those already prone to a particular ideological bent. Their job, by and large, is to persuade a population that their vision is preferable to others proposed. Unfortunately, this is difficult for a peaceful movement; violence is a compelling force and one often wielded by incumbent political powers. But in the event that a population is persuaded by arguments made peacefully, it is likely the outcome will be more stable in the long term than those led either than a divided opposition or by a unified violent force. The youth should embrace this fact, and resist the sense that unity is futile. No opposition movement will be entirely cohesive in its vision for the future, but without a general agreement the the situation will become a power vacuum and make the movement vulnerable to cooptation by whatever group is most powerful and cohesive. This is how the military usurped power in the aftermath of Mubarak's ousting in 2011. It also explains how the youth--even those supporting the Muslim brotherhood--were so quickly excluded once the Brotherhood was elected. Ahmed Maher, the leader of the youth protest movement "April 6th" explains "We supported Morsi during the presidential campaign and were a reason behind his victory. The Muslim Brotherhood loved us at that time. But when disagreement started over the constitution, a campaign of distortion started against us".

Syria is caught in the middle of a similar situation. The movemnt's/-s' are united in their goal of regime change, but their short-term conceptions of how the overthrow should occur are varied, and long-term visions range from genuine democratic reforms to the implementation of Sharia law. The problem is not that the groups themselves have no vision, it is that there are competing visions preventing unification, making it hard for opposition forces to gain a foothold against the regime, and making it difficult for the international community to support a collective opposition.² Ultimately this places foreign states that are in a position to help to pit themselves against each other. This makes it more difficult for the international community to make an impact and makes the issue of support a prohibitively political one.

 Turkey's opposition is the most cohesive--at least in the short-term--of the movements discussed herein. Yet while we have only witnessed the early stages of what may become a much longer standoff between the government and its increasingly vocal opposition in Turkey, only discontent is certain. The repeal of specific legislation that threaten the remaining urban green spaces is the most imminent political demand. But protesters' general condemnation of the current regime may indicate larger ambitions related to more sweeping and systemic reforms. At present, their specific list of demands lack any systemic reforms and concentrate only on culpability and the retreat from undemocratic practices exercised by the police in response to demonstrations. For instance, the rejection of the ban on alcohol has gained only moderate attention, and the broader condemnation of the increasingly Islamist tendencies of the regime have not found a place in the specific list of demands. But perhaps this is prudent. Perhaps some sense of consensus is in the works, and if that is the case, it is a wise strategy. Making conflicting demands signals an easily divided mass--a weaker and more vulnerable one. It is the last signal a movement means to impart.

But sooner, rather than later, a movement should, at the very least, impart a long-term active vision. That is, the movement should make clear what it does want--not just what it doesn't. One of the Free Syrian Army's biggest mistakes has been to rally supporters singularly around the desire to see Assad ousted, without any articulate ambitions for a post-Assad state. As a result, "revolutionaries"--whomever they may represent--form a temporary alliance, recognizing that their immediate objectives require some degree of unification, even if their overall ambitions are at stark odds.

Thus, the lesson here is that democratic movements require a generally unified short- and long-term visions. Recent movements have so far failed to achieve these components. The formation of a successful movement--one that can withstand outsider attempts at co-optation--will prove a laborious and pain-staking process. Unfortunately, this question is nil in some instances. A plea to future pro-democracy movements is this: first, recognize that lasting reforms are unlikely so long as those in power are challenged by a divided, and therefore weaker, opposition. Second, have confidence that the sacrifices made for the sake of solidarity will likely prove their worth.

 *This title is perhaps reductionist. Certainly, as you make your way through the post you'll notice that my argument is not so much that there are no consequences to opposition movements, but rather that those consequences are, by and large, not those intended by any--or at least the majority--of the groups initially involved.

¹ I presume that ElBareidi's singling out of the youth is a product of the massive turnout of youth demonstrators. Nevertheless, it seems unfair to single out a particular demographic as the overarching source of a movement's undoing. Divisions existed within the youth, between "the youth" as opposed to other
Admittedly, the "how" is more of a past question as the mode of regime change effort has definitively crossed the point of no-return to violent civil war, from what was once a peaceful movement for change. "How" is still a relevant question when considering macro-level analysis of the effectiveness of grassroots movements.

²It is now apparent that Qatar is funneling the arms supplied to rebels in the Libyan revolution into Syria. One might interpret this as a good thing, noting that the West's pleas for Middle-Eastern states to shoulder some of the burden in this conflict are finally being heard. But this relief is short-lived, as it is also apparent that some of the groups that Qatar chooses to arm are not those most likely to promote democratic transition in Syria (or anywhere, really). I should note, however, that reports indicate that currently, Qatar is supplying the FSA rather than to blacklisted extremist groups. Nevertheless, the latter groups are having little trouble obtaining weapons from the various FSA allies.

Rejecting Silence 2: What Not To Do (or Corporations Behaving Badly)

The Walt Disney Corporation offers what is perhaps the best example of irresponsible response to the disaster in Bangladesh. Initially acting as a reasonable contracting firm, Disney halted its garment production in the country, responding to troubling reports of bad working conditions among firms with which they contracted. Following the factory collapse, just days later, Disney made the decision to pull out of the country entirely "until local conditions improve."¹ Just one percent of Disney's manufacturing takes place in Bangladesh, so changing locations won't be too costly for them. But for the Bangladeshi employees who will go from unsafe employment to no employment, rather than to safe employment, this will be an extremely exploitative move. And how is the public expected to react? Perhaps some will take the naive view that by abandoning the culture of local corruption and neglect they are taking a stand in support of reform. What such individuals fail to understand is that such behavior only demonstrates lack of responsibility. Rather than rejecting bad labor practices, they are abandoning the very people whose abuse drove them to halt production--essentially punishing them for the crimes of their overseers and local officials. Furthermore, Bangladesh is not the only site of bad working conditions, and it is unlikely they will set up facilities in countries with much improved conditions.
Essentially, they are exploiting bad practices in other countries for the sake of the company's public relations, rather than paying due diligence to those they have now famously victimized. This is despicable.

While it is hard--even unsettling--to embrace companies like H&M who are, perhaps, the retailer most culpable for this tragedy, it, and other retailers who pledged to improve conditions are those most worthy of praise. Abandoning workers will not assist those victimized in the industry. Improvements, however, demonstrate respect for workers. Of course, whether or not these companies will live up to their commitments is yet to be seen. But public support for the stated reforms, rather than persistent condemnation, is a promising way forward.

As such, Disney's behavior explicitly demonstrates a problematic approach to reform. Public support--or at least tolerance--for those companies who continue to employ Bangladeshi workers, but with demonstrated commitment to reforms, is important both for the industry, and for those victimized by its past behavior. Nevertheless, consumers should be wary of promises, and continue to be vigilant  as reforms unfold--or don't--and speak up when companies' commitments are abandoned.

¹ The key point here is that Disney has a responsibility--as an employer--to be part of the solution, rather than outsource the responsibility for "cleaning up" to others in the industry. If every retailer took this position, there would be no improvement. This behavior epitomizes the wrong approach to correcting the wrongs already done to the society, as will be further explained throughout this posting.

Rejecting Silence 1: The University

**Preface: This is the first of what will be a series of posts inspired by the shameful catastrophe in Bangladesh. In it I'll draw attention to various undiscussed players (as in the last), share ideas for effective action, and comment on actions taken and not taken by major players. If anyone has any specific content requests, please feel free.**

~*~

Before I respond to a reader's facebook request for my recommendations regarding the responsibilities of larger shareholders, I am happy to inform those who don't know of two positive developments. First is that a coalition of investors and faith-based organizations, through the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, have published a letter demanding improved working conditions for laborers in Bangladesh. Second, Amalgamated Bank LongView Funds drafted a similar letter signed by investors¹ from numerous organizations and firms. The language of these letters rebukes American corporations' (including The Gap Ltd. and Walmart), arguments that investors interests are best served by non-binding agreements for improved working conditions. Investors represented by these letters account for $1.1 trillion and $1.35 trillion in assets and assets under management, respectively. The interests--fiduciary and moral--of investors, whether signatories or not, are vulnerable to the effects to the consequences posed by signatories. Compliance with these influential investors ultimately serves the best interests of all those involved.

Of course, the list below (fn1) in no way represents all of any particular kind of industry. So, for a moment, let's discuss a major category of players completely absent from the list: universities. Unfortunately, universities often keep the specifics² of their corporate investments under lock and key. However, there are are other ways to influence these institutions to be responsible with their financial dealings.

Educational institutions answer to numerous players, and are therefore more vulnerable to pressure from various groups. For one, universities are accountable to students. Public universities are accountable to tax payers. All universities are accountable to alumni. They're also answerable to sports fans! This puts power in a wide variety of individuals hands and still, somehow, the expansive cross-section of the public takes only sporadic interest in universities' contributions--positive or negative--to the human rights discourse and experience.

Luckily, given the secrecy surrounding university finances, institutes of higher education are influential as more than just investors. They also have important contracts with manufacturers and retailers in a host of different industries. Therefore, pressure can be placed on universities--or collegiate athletic conferences as a whole--to make signing rights agreements a condition of contracts or contract renewal. In 2012 the Collegiate Licensing Company estimated that the market value of college-licensed goods was $4.3 billion. That's up from $3.9 billion in 2010. It is plausible, if not certain, that universities contracting with apparel manufacturers have some means of influencing behavior. Could a corporation possibly argue that signing a labor rights agreement served its shareholders' interests less than losing collegiate brand contracts? I certainly don't think so--especially if the university was joined by corporate shareholders in their plea for industry reforms.

In sum, universities are in a somewhat unique position to motivate change: They often hold sway as investors. It is likely that all have some pull as a brand. But more importantly for those of us feeling powerless, universities are vulnerable to the calls of many populations. That is both accountable to and influential among a diverse array of interests. It's time to make OUR voices heard.

Let's give everyone something to cheer about.

Coming up next...What not to do: Corporations Behaving Badly

¹Including representatives from: Corporate Governance Amalgamated Bank LongView Funds, Office of Investment American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, California State Teachers' Retirement System, Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, F&C Asset Management plc, North American Engagement Hermes Equity Ownership Services Limited, Illinois State Board of Investment Cllr, LAPFF  Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, Responsible Investment & Governance MN, The Nathan Cummings Foundation, The New York City Pension Funds, New York State Common Retirement Fund, Responsible Investment PGGM Investments, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Teamsters Affiliates Pension Plan, and UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust

² Many university boards have created special associations governed by the university to manage and choose their investments. These are often called "Offices of Investment Management" or "OIMs". The Google search term "university office of investment management" returns several. Of course, you can also be more specific in your choice of terms.

Perpetrating Silence

Since the disaster in Bangladesh that claimed 1,127 lives, analysts have tossed blame around various parties, including (in no particular order) the owner of the Rana Plaza factory building, local government, the multiple subcontracted firms that operated within the building, and Western retailers. Others contend that it is the stinginess of consumers¹ that drives the neglect found in factories like the one in Rana Plaza, which have been caught in a spree² of fatal disasters throughout the country. In fact, just six days ago a fire in a Dhaka sweater factory killed the owner and seven workers.

My intention here is not to deny that any or all of these parties maintain some degree of responsibility. Rather, it is to bring attention to a largely undiscussed perpetrator of irresponsibility in this catastrophe: corporate shareholders. Right or wrong, corporations maintain that they are driven to subcontracting--even with unreliable companies--in order to meet their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders.  Shareholders hold a considerable amount of power, whether they know it or not, as they are invited to participate in annual meetings where many corporate policy decisions are made. Additionally, they hold the right to draft resolutions for consideration.

Given that resolutions may be of fiduciary consequence for other shareholders (for example, divestment as a product of failed or passed policy), they should be treated with the same concern for fiduciary responsibility as those policy decisions that come from executives. Indeed, although many European garment retailers have agreed to a binding accord mandating that they improve and contribute financial resources to the improvement of workplace safety, American retailers (The Gap and Walmart, though The Gap is spearheading the resistance) have refused, hiding behind their conflicting conception of fiduciary responsibility. As if public shaming does not threaten their ability to profit. And shareholders, though they possess the potential to form a critical mass in decision-making, are often ignorant of, or indifferent to their opportunities and responsibilities to motivate changes. Frequently shareholders assume that their only role as an investor is as a collector of returns on purchases of shares. But investors can--and should--also see themselves as members of a community whose decisions reflect not only their individual interests, but their integrity as well.

Unfortunately, accountability is much harder to achieve. The well-crafted art of "plausible deniability" makes prosecution of responsible parties challenging--perhaps, given the politics of business, impossible. But this is no reason to throw in the towel on labor rights. These disasters themselves are not inevitable, even under the present circumstances. Correcting the problems just requires different actors to assume stewardship roles. For shareholders, this is not a role that is earned, but one acquired in tandem with the purchase  or acquisition shares.

It's time for shareholders to realize that as partial owners of these corporations, they too have a responsibility to ensure that their companies meet--if not surpass--the basic rights of the laborers they employ, no matter what country.

¹ Interestingly, NPR's Marketplace offers the view that "Ultimately, the pressure driving the cut throat competition for cheaper clothing comes from one place," citing Stanford University professor of Economics Nicholas Bloom: “American consumers want to buy clothes for low cost...Companies -- even big ones like Walmart or Target “are just rats in a maze. We are the maze." For a critical look at this proposition...stay tuned.

² According to an article published by Human Rights Watch, "The Rana building collapse is the latest in a long list of factory building tragedies in Bangladesh, Human Rights Watch said. In April 2005, 73 garment workers died in a factory collapse in Savar. In February 2006, 18 workers were killed in a garment factory collapse in Dhaka. In June 2010, 25 people were killed in a building collapse in Dhaka. In November 2012, more than 100 workers died in a fire at a factory in Dhaka."

Ignoring (not forgetting) History

Krugman (10-11-2012)

The tendency to abandon lessons of history is a prominent trademark of contemporary policy-making. In a talk at the Commonwealth Club of California last spring, Paul Krugman remarked that "not only were they [the banks, specifically JP Morgan] taking risks just like the banks did before the big crisis, they were taking the same risks...it's as if they were determined to have a repeat -- to remake that movie when the first one is still in the theaters." But the metaphor extends beyond economic policy, constituting a fundamental characteristic of US foreign policy as well. This country, and indeed, the international community, has faced problems similar to those of the present day before now. The Great Depression, for instance, was a product of banks getting to big, resulting in the marginalization and economic devastation of the most vulnerable citizens. It had the consequence of increasing disparities of wealth and driving the kind of political polarization we see today.

But, unlike policy-makers of the depression-era, today's politicians are resolved to maintain the status quo. For instance, the Glass-Steagall Act was put in place to combat the risky behavior of the financial sector that contributed in no small part to the depression. But, in the 1990s--the time of plenty--President Clinton made the ill-concieved decision to approve the bill's dismemberment. Admittedly, it is unlikely that Glass-Steagall would have prevented the current crisis if still in effect. But the point (that we already know that an unregulated banking system can have catastrophic effects is a lesson we've already learned) still stands. And this is not an accident. Krugman further points out that individuals have been "paid to forget" these lessons--by those who can not only afford to bankroll campaigns and aggressively lobby legislators, but who also profit from any resulting economic collapse. But it's not a secret: most Americans can't.

The same people further deny that government spending--namely the New Deal--contributed to the end of the Great Depression, arguing instead that the industry that World War Two promoted was the key to recovery. What they fail to recognize--but undoubtedly know--is that it was government spending that made the growth of industry possible. Indeed, throughout the economic recovery of the government both borrowed and spent record amounts. Projects initiated under the New Deal permitted growth to continue after the war. It produced roads making transportation of goods possible and it put money in people's pockets that would be spent, thereby stimulating the economy, rather than saved, as was the money belonging to the wealthiest. What does this show? War does not stimulate growth (a fact all too obvious from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan), but government spending does.

But shockingly (or perhaps not so), it's not only historical evidence of the economic costs of austerity that are aggressively denied. It's the evidence of the present too. Think Greece. Austerity there has produced a volatile situation in which unemployment means people aren't earning, and therefore aren't spending money. Under these situations, growth is impossible. And so is paying down the national debt.
Still, lenders imposed harsh austerity measures including widespread spending cuts on Greece (and other troubled economies) which only magnified the liquidity trap. The truth is, there is only so much a budget can be cut. It can't be cut more than it spends, and it's impossible to reduce the budget to zero and maintain a viable state. Stimulating the economy, on the other hand, means increased revenue. Since we know that trickle-down economics doesn't work, we also know that taxes won't minimize growth of the economy. Why would companies invest in building factories or hiring, if demand for products is down and there's little hope of increasing it? Stimulus must be more widespread than trusting individual companies to create jobs. A widespread injection of money is crucial. Fearmongerers would have us believe that such an injection would cause massive inflation. They've been predicting it for years. It hasn't happened.

Apart from domestic policy, the US also maintains a foreign policy ambivalent to the lessons of history. In A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power documents multiple cases of genocide that have occurred since the holocaust but have received inadequate, late, or no intervention from the United States. Syria poses an interesting problem—but it’s not unique. Indeed, we saw it in Libya. Currently—and for the foreseeable future—aggression targeting political groups or parties does not constitute genocide. But although this disqualifies the invocation of the genocide convention, it does not change the fact that crimes against humanity are occurring in Syria. And that under the 2005 World Summit Responsibility to Protect (R2P), such crimes still warrant international intervention.

In a previous post I commented on the dangerous trajectory the conflict in Syria—and, consequently, the direction that the US relationship with Syria is taking. I discussed the effects of inaction, and how guilt can lead the US to take an overly tolerant approach to the oppositional victor—namely in Rwanda. So what am I advocating? Insofar as a political or tactical solution is concerned, I, like most, am at a loss. But there are questions to which we have answers. We have an approximate estimate of refugees and IDPs in Syria. We have relatively accurate figures regarding the cost of maintaining the bare minimum standards of care for this ever-growing population. But currently, the UNHCR is operating on 25 percent of its estimated need. 

And this is where I return to the issue of history-denial. We already know what happens when agencies like UNHCR are under-resourced. The result is an angry civilian population, which makes for easy pray for combatant recruitment. Indeed, few things breed animosity and contempt like neglect. The 1990s crisis along the Congo-Rwanda border offers clear evidence. There are also complex emotional components of neglect of civilians--hopelessness, bitterness, and vengeful desires, for instance.Whereas desperation can be addressed thoroughly and quickly with sufficient political will, these emotional components are more difficult to eliminate. Many of these stem from the political roots of the conflict and even once a political solution is put into effect, years if not generations may pass before feelings of resentment and betrayal are mitigated. 

The vulnerability and desperation faced by refugees have severe and game-changing consequences that not only effect the trajectory of the conflict, but will potentially also pose mounting risks of insecurities for the international community. This is a particularly disconcerting consequence of globalization, and one to which virtually no country is immune.   Interestingly, US has contributed quite generously to humanitarian efforts, comparable to the unmet obligations of other nations. Still, the UNHCR is left to operate on approximately 21 percent of the estimated budget needs. But, as has been the case on numerous occasions, the US (and the international community) offers too little too late. Refugee camps hold over a million refugees and internally displaced people remain scattered throughout the country, facing much risk and experiencing growing anger and frustration.  When the Assad regime falls (yes, I'm assuming that this will be the eventual outcome), the US will likely find that resources that build trust with and among the people would have proved a wise investment--perhaps more than resources spent ousting the current regime. It might have made civilians less willing to concede their newly-acquired rights to extremists in exchange for a chance at not being hungry. It might have lessened resentment for the US and decreased the potential of an animus post-Assad US-Syrian relationship. Civilians are presented with choices now. Addressing the needs of civilians caught in conflict is not a challenge that can be left to the future.

Although the most convincing argument for adequate humanitarian support at the policy-making level is one based on national security, the best argument is a moral one. The fact is, the morally right answer to this problem is the one that will yield the best results overall. Although we haven't fully observed any instances of a wholly sufficient response to humanitarian crisis, we are very familiar with the horrific consequences of those that fall short. 

Let me conclude with this final point because I want to be quite clear. I am not suggesting that a humanitarian response is in anyway a longterm solution to the problem in Syria. A humanitarian mission is not successful until it can leave, and that requires a political solution. My argument is this: given that we don't have (nor should we have) any explicit control over the political outcomes of this conflict, we should recognize that we have some agency in how civilians experience the war--and the international community's response to it. I commend the President for his bid for cooperation from the countries yet to meet their obligations of support, but should the bid continue to be unsuccessful the US will have to consider further contributions to humanitarian, rather than such focused military efforts. The humanitarian battle can be won, and is one that we, as human beings, have the right and responsibility to fight. 

Ultimately, ending the political battles at home and abroad require not only that the events past be remembered, but that we ensure that the lessons of that history endure and culminate in wise and prudent policy-making.